

ARTICLE 1-E

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# A losing game

To become competitive: A more rational balance will have to be struck between overweening concern for civil liberties and the ability of our government to identify and neutralize hostile agents of a foreign power.

By E. HOWARD HUNT

**A**s the Walker family's alleged spy ring expands into public awareness with each succeeding arrest, one hears the customary gasps of incredulity "that such a thing could happen." Yet, certain sectors of the public that profess revulsion over the betrayals of the Walker spy

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gang represent the same elements that reflexively denounce all but the most superficial domestic security measures, liken the FBI to Hitler's Sicherheitsdienst (SD) and equate the CIA with the Third Reich's Gestapo.

The Walker spy net is but the latest in a long and depressing series of Soviet penetrations that include employees of the CIA, National Security Agency and the FBI. Their recruitment by the Soviet Union's KGB and GRU (its military intelligence) rank as phenomenal achievements even though these American agents were motivated by money rather than by ideology. In fact, with the exception of Britain's notorious "Cambridge Ring" (Philby, Maclean, Burgess and Blunt) espionage archives disclose few ideological agents. So it is safe to accept the FBI's initial assessment of the Walker ring's motivation as mercenary.

When the Walker cases unfold in federal court we may expect at least a few details concerning John Walker's recruitment by the U.S.S.R., whether he volunteered his services or was approached by a Soviet agent; physical descriptions of his Soviet controllers, the methodology of dead-drops, recognition signals, communications, payment, and related trappings of clandestine work. But public fascination with espionage

tradecraft should not be allowed to cloud the underlying fact that these men were in the pay of a foreign power — the U.S.S.R. — that once again has shown itself to be an implacable and resourceful enemy.

There will be those who wonder why the CIA and FBI seldom register similar recruitment and penetration successes inside the Soviet Union. Although such achievements would be greatly in our national interest — and I hope there are many — working conditions within a Denied Area are incomparably more difficult than those afforded Soviet agents in the open societies of the United States, Canada and Mexico, and Western Europe. For the U.S.S.R. is a police state, fully organized against information gathering by foreigners. To surveil not only foreigners, but their own people as well, the KGB directs at least 250,000 agents within the U.S.S.R., and an estimated 10,000 spies abroad. Estimates of Soviet intelligence personnel within Soviet embassies and other missions in the Free World vary from 60 percent to

80 percent of listed strength, and may run even higher in such key international organizations as the United Nations and its ancillaries. By contrast, the CIA is allowed to field only a handful of intelligence officers under official cover, many of whom soon become known to the host country — and to the KGB.

Forty years ago, when I was writing in Hollywood, one producer, who had a utilitarian approach to story-lines, used to interrupt story conferences with the periodic cry, "Who's got the papers?"

In his lexicon, "the papers" could be a diamond necklace, a treasure map, a land deed — anything of value that occasioned the inevitable search and chase. He wanted to know — and the audience with him — where "the papers" were, and who had them. In terms of plot development the precept was valuable and I suspect that within the U.S. Navy today there are those who are now reflecting on why they hadn't kept better track of the very real papers that the Walkers — apparently with little difficulty — were able to extract from the Navy's security vaults, and hand over, bundle after bundle, to their Soviet controllers.

But while a ship's captain, or a Task Force admiral, has occasional reason to examine classified documents, the custodians and more frequent handlers of those documents are radiomen, yeomen, file clerks and cryptographers. They are the ones with constant unrestricted access to secret files, and they are the ones, quite logically, who are targeted by Soviet agents. The Walkers being a current case in point.

Rarely does the KGB attempt to recruit a Western diplomatic officer; instead, they target an ambassador's secretary, a lonely code-clerk, an embassy typist, through all of whose hands classified material flows continually, and almost uncheckably. Romance and money are the twin tools of such recruitments, no less effective through traditional usage. One Western diplomatic secretary tearfully confessed her treason after she realized that the KGB officer who seduced her with promises of marriage had joined his wife in Moscow, and was not returning to his former post. For two years, though, she had worked as his accomplice in extracting cryptographic material from her embassy, documents whose compromise caused consternation in NATO circles. As usual, concern arrived too late.

Identifying a Soviet operative seldom comes about through fictional methods of detection. John Walker was denounced by his ex-wife. GRU Colonel "Rudolf Abel" was fingered by one of his agents who had kept for his own use money intended for the Rosenbergs' legal defense, and feared the consequences. In Southeast Asia a productive KGB officer was exposed by his wife after he contracted VD from an Oriental paramour. Col. Oleg Penkovskiy wrote his own death warrant by leading a life of conspicuous consumption made possible by British-American money; superiors noticed his luxurious lifestyle and commenced inquiries that led to his arrest.

Espionage agents — on both sides — are not supermen, but human beings

endowed with similar traits and vulnerabilities.

Little more than a decade ago, nearly mortal blows were delivered to the CIA and the FBI by the Church and Pike committees, which exposed, with lascivious delight, a number of historical misdeeds by both agencies. President Ford's attorney general — an academician named Edward Levi — followed through with orders to the FBI that made it impossible for the FBI to investigate threats to national security until an overt act had been committed. Thus, a terrorist group became immune to penetration until after its bomb wrecked the Capitol. Under the notorious "Levi guidelines" a suspected Soviet agent could not be

surveilled until after committing a prosecutable act, in consequence of which the Bureau's Foreign Counter Intelligence unit was stripped of manpower and authority.

In a complementary move by then CIA Director Stansfield Turner, more than 700 experienced CIA officers and employees were discharged in a three-



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month period, effectively gutting CIA's capacity to perform clandestine tasks. The longtime head of CIA's counterintelligence staff, James Angleton, was summarily dismissed, followed shortly by the disgusted resignations of his deputy and executive officer. Thus, the agency unit most closely allied to the FBI's counter-spy work lost its senior operating officers, and with them, an immensely valuable and irreplaceable portion of CIA's institutional memory.

So it is not to be wondered that "such things" as the Walkers' betrayals can happen. Indeed, it is chilling to contemplate how many other Walkers exist unchallenged within our defense and national security establishments.

Washington abounds with specially-funded think-tanks and institutes whose thinly concealed purpose is to rend the tattered veils of national secrecy and dismember what remains of our national security organizations. In working toward those ends they have no better tool than the illy-conceived Freedom of Information Act, which empowers all comers — including Soviet agents — to gain unprecedented access to information concerning the inner workings of our national security agencies.

The Soviet Union is prepared to go any lengths to acquire our advanced technology. California's "Silicon Valley" is a top KGB priority, and will become increasingly targeted for pene-

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tration as research for the Strategic Defense Initiative goes forward. Collaterally, the KGB's quest for high technology increases in scope and boldness, aided not infrequently by the West's desire for profits. Last year the Digital Equipment Corp. was fined \$1.5 million by the Department of Commerce for sending as many as three highly sensitive VAX 11782 computers to the U.S.S.R. in defiance of export control regulations. Such acquisitions of U.S. technology save the U.S.S.R. billions of dollars and five years in their research cycles, while giving Soviet scientists an intimate look at

U.S. components, and lead time to prepare technical counter-measures.

Unquestionably, the classified materials sold to the U.S.S.R. by the Walker spy network are worth incalculable millions to the purchasers who now possess sensitive details of naval attack doctrine, and hitherto-secret aspects of submarine communications. Damage to the undersea leg of our Defense Triad has got to be enormous, and may never be fully revealed to the public lest further compromise ensue. At the very least, the Navy must answer for incredibly loose handling of its deepest

secrets, while the Congress should take immediate steps to restore to the FBI its former ability to function effectively against the legion of foreign agents now comfortably ensconced within our borders. And against whose conspiracies our security agencies are next to impotent.

Not even the Walker revelations will persuade pro-Soviet Western intellectuals that the U.S.S.R. is not composed of nice guys bent upon achieving world peace. That concept is a cultivated myth long immune to demonstrable evidence that the only goal of interest to the Kremlin is Soviet domination of our world.

The crucial struggle between Western democracy and Soviet totalitarianism is everywhere to be seen. It is in the clandestine world of the Walkers where our country is at enormous disadvantage. If our security agencies are to become competitive in what is currently a losing game, a more rational balance will have to be struck between overweening concern for civil liberties, and the ability of our government to identify and neutralize hostile agents of a foreign power. Unless a realistic world view takes the place of wishful thinking, and a positive counter-espionage posture replaces the supine, we will inevitably find ourselves without the means to defend ourselves against a ruthless and predatory foe.

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JOHN  
WALKERARTHUR  
WALKERJERRY  
WHITWORTHMICHAEL  
WALKER

## Principals in the Walker Spy Case

**JOHN WALKER**, 47, a retired 21-year Navy communications specialist, is charged with trying to slip secret documents to Soviet agents.

**ARTHUR WALKER**, 50, a retired Navy lieutenant commander, allegedly leaked confidential documents to Johnny Walker, his brother, from the defense contracting firm at which he worked.

**JERRY WHITWORTH**, 45, a retired Navy communications operator, allegedly stole documents from the California naval air station at which he worked.

**MICHAEL WALKER**, 22, a Navy seaman aboard the USS Nimitz, is accused of supplying Johnny Walker, his father, with secret documents from the ship.